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Emerging Economies
powers”, a term often used by political scientists, rather than 
using the term “emerging economies”.3 Based on empirical 
comparisons and regression analyses in two of my former 
publications,4 we defi ne a regional power as follows:
A regional power is an economic power (in a given region) 
that has infl uence and possesses the capacity for regional 
and global action. It has a relatively large population and 
covers a relatively large area. The regional power achieves 
high economic growth, above the regional average, over a 
longer period of time and thus provides a growing market 
for the region. It plays an important role in trade within the 
region. It develops industrially and technologically; the state 
expenditures for R&D increase and come close to the level 
in the OECD world. The regional power has regionally and 
globally active businesses that are getting stronger and will 
lead to fi erce competition for businesses from the OECD 
world within the regional–global value chains. The regional 
power increasingly provides public goods in the form of a 
stable currency, a reliable monetary policy and develop-
3 The term “emerging economies” is defi ned by economic criteria (per 
capita income, increase of share in world markets of manufactured 
goods and/or services); see G. G a u l i e r, F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l : 
EU15 Trade with Emerging Economies and Rentier States: Leverag-
ing Geography, Paris 2009, CEPII Document de Travail 25, p. 12; for 
the economic debate on “regional powers”, “rising powers”, “south-
ern engines of global growth”  and “emerging powers” see R. K a -
p p e l : On the Economics of Regional Powers, in: N. G o d e h a rd t , 
D. N a b e r s  (eds.): Regional Powers and Regional Orders, London 
2011, Routledge, pp. 68-92; I. B e n s i d o u , F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l : 
The Integration of China and India into the World Economy: A Com-
parison, in: The European Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 
6, No. 1, 2009, pp. 131-155; A.U. S a n t o s - P a u l i n o , G. Wa n  (eds.): 
Southern Engines of Growth, Oxford 2010, Oxford University Press. 
Political scientists have dealt with the concept of regional powers for 
years, focusing on leadership, hegemony and infl uence. Nolte’s politi-
cal science approach identifi es fundamental political criteria; see D. 
N o l t e : How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and 
Research Topics, in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, 2010, 
pp. 881-901. 
4 R. K a p p e l : On the Economics of Regional Powers: Comparing Chi-
na, India, Brazil, and South Africa, Hamburg 2010, GIGA Working Pa-
per No. 145; and R. K a p p e l : On the Economics of Regional Powers, 
in: N. G o d e h a rd t , D. N a v e r s , op. cit.
On a world scale, economic integration has risen rapidly in 
recent years. The Uruguay and Doha Rounds have reduced 
trade restrictions; transport and communication costs are 
falling. The world is getting fl atter. The former distinction be-
tween core and periphery (rich industrialised countries and 
poor developing countries) is no longer valid because many 
developing countries are catching up. There is an economic 
and political power shift, which is associated with a relative 
decline of the “West” and a relative rise of the “East”. The 
emerging economies are regional powers and partly even 
global powers. China and other regional powers will not 
seek to undermine the capitalist system and the ideas and 
principals of the global liberal order, as some authors have 
argued, but instead will try to gain more leadership within 
it.1 In this paper I will show how the world is being changed 
by these nations, focusing on China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa, which use their respective economic, hard, struc-
tural and soft powers.2 We shall also analyse how the EU 
is affected by these fast and deep political, economic and 
technological changes, which have led to the rising infl u-
ence of the regional powers. We shall talk about “regional 
*  President of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 
Hamburg, and a professor at the Universities of Hamburg and Leipzig, 
Germany. The author wishes to express his thanks to Birte Pohl for 
her assistance in providing the detailed trade and investment statis-
tics used in this paper.
1 For a discussion on the leadership of regional powers, the changes in 
the liberal order, the decline of the West and the rise of regional pow-
ers, from the “Washington Consensus” to the “Beijing Consensus”, 
and the rise of authoritarianism, see G.J. I k e n b e r r y : The Future of 
the Liberal World Order. Internationalism After America, in: Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, 2011, pp. 56-68; S. S c h i r m : Leaders in Need 
of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance, in: European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2010, pp. 197-222. 
2 On economic, hard, structural, soft and smart power see J.S. N y e : 
The Future of Power, New York 2011, Public Affairs; D. L e m k e : Di-
mensions of Hard Power: Regional Leadership and Material Capabili-
ties, in: D. F l e m e s  (ed.): Regional Leadership in the Global System: 
Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers, Farnham 2010, 
Ashgate, pp. 31-50; S. S t r a n g e : What is Economic Power, and Who 
Has It?, in: International Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1975, pp. 207-224; D. 
F l e m e s  (ed.), op. cit.
Robert Kappel*
The Challenge to Europe: Regional Powers and 
the Shifting of the Global Order
Europe’s position as the most important economic area in the world is gradually being 
challenged by China and other regional powers which have been growing faster than the EU in 
the last 20 years. An economic and political power shift is taking place. How can Europe best 
cope with this challenge?
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technological spillover); vertical networks (technologically 
leading businesses from the regional powers determine the 
governance in these chains, and leadership in the global 
value chain represents an important basis for the economic 
position of regional powers in the region); regional integra-
tion (regional powers take on a key role in regional organi-
sations – for example, in the governance of an anchor cur-
rency); and last but not least relational power (competitors 
from many regions are competing with the regional power). 
We tested for country size, population, per capita income, 
growth of GDP, foreign trade, industrialisation, direct in-
vestment, research and development expenditure, public 
goods, and institutions. Some of the signifi cant fi ndings of 
the descriptive statistics are illustrated in the following six 
observations, thereby focusing our analysis on China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa.7
• Observation 1: Regional powers have a very large land 
area and a large population in comparison to other coun-
tries in their region. India and China are the most heav-
ily populated countries in the world. China’s share of the 
global population is approximately 20%; India’s is 17%. 
Brazil and South Africa are smaller in terms of popula-
tion and area; however, they are relatively large in their 
respective regions.
• Observation 2: Some regional powers have a higher per 
capita income than the world and regional average. Per 
capita incomes in India and China, however, are below 
the regional average, whereas South Africa’s is signifi -
cantly higher. The average growth in income per capita 
in the regional powers was higher than that of the respec-
tive regions in the period 1990–2009, even though some 
smaller countries in the regions were able to achieve 
much greater growth (for example, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Botswana). The average income of regional powers 
was still only approximately 15% of the income of the rich 
countries.
• Observation 3: With the exceptions of Brazil and South 
Africa, regional powers have achieved a higher average 
growth of GDP (1980–2009) and contribute signifi cantly 
to global and regional growth (see Figure 1). Only China 
and, to a lesser degree, India are of importance for the 
global economy; Brazil and South Africa, in contrast, are 
much less important. Both Brazil’s and South Africa’s av-
erage growth during the last 30 years amounted to only 
approximately 2%; due to their lower economic dyna-
mism they are not “engines of growth”, either globally or 
regionally, as is often assumed.
7 See in detail R. K a p p e l : On the Economics of Regional Powers: 
Comparing China …, op. cit.
ment aid. It takes on a growing role in the governance of 
the region, particularly with respect to regional cooperation 
agreements. And it uses its economic and network power to 
infl uence development on a global and regional scale.
In the following, this paper will develop a proposal for a con-
cept of the economics of regional powers and summarise 
the empirical results. It will then illustrate how much the EU 
is challenged globally and regionally by the regional powers, 
and how strong the EU is economically. This contribution 
focuses on trade, direct investment and technological rise. 
The fi nal section analyses the global and regional signifi -
cance of China, India, Brazil and South Africa, and their role 
in international trade and investment.
Empirical Results: How Important Are Regional 
Powers?
Testing several indicators, we identifi ed the following coun-
tries as regional powers: China, India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.5 Our 
approach and the empirical observations indicate that other 
countries are not regional powers because they fail to meet 
some elements of the aforementioned defi nition and crite-
ria, i.e. small physical area and small population, low growth, 
weakly developed industry, slow technological upgrading, 
low regional trade integration, weak soft power and limited 
provision of public goods etc. – for example, Israel, Iran, Pa-
kistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Argentina, Venezuela and Nigeria. 
They are important but do not belong to those nations which 
exert global and regional infl uence, either in regional or glo-
bal institutions or as economic hubs in the region. For com-
parison, the data of some of the aforementioned countries 
were taken into consideration.
A review of the literature shows that there are numerous ap-
proaches to describing power and leadership in econom-
ics.6 On the basis of these theoretical approaches, we devel-
oped criteria regarding the “economics of regional powers”. 
These are: economic dynamism (attractiveness to foreign 
direct investment – FDI); geography (positive relations with 
neighbours leading to cooperation, increase in growth and 
5 Russia is excluded from our analysis.
6 See R. K a p p e l : On the Economics of Regional Powers: Compar-
ing China..., op. cit. and id.: On the Economics of Regional Powers, 
in: N. G o d e h a rd t , D. N a v e r s , op. cit., focusing on the following 
authors: Joseph Schumpeter, François Perroux, Andreas Predöhl, 
Charles Kindleberger, Susan Strange, Paul Krugman, Gary Gereffi 
and others; for a discussion on economic power see C.P. K i n d l e -
b e rg e r : Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: 
Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides, in: International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp. 242-254; K.W. R o t h s c h i l d : The 
Absence of Power in Contemporary Economic Theory, in: The Journal 
of Socio-Economics, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2002, pp. 433-442; P. B a rd h a n : 
On the Concept of Power in Economics, in: Economics and Politics, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, 1991, pp. 265-277.
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In addition to the descriptive analysis, we controlled for oth-
er variables and thus were better able to evaluate the im-
portance of selected variables.9 The following results for this 
sample are robust.
• The base specifi cation clearly shows that sheer size 
(measured in both total GDP and population size) is a fun-
damental feature of regional powers. However, regional 
“superiority” is also very important, as refl ected by the 
coeffi cient for the GDP per capita (measured as distance 
from the regional mean).
• When basic variables are controlled for, growth of GDP 
per capita does not seem to be a determinant of being a 
regional power. This effect is almost statistically signifi -
cant.
• The share of exports in GDP does not play a role in shap-
ing a regional power. However, compared to other coun-
tries in the respective region, a country with a higher 
share of exports in its GDP is more likely to be a regional 
power.
• A higher share of industrial value added in GDP also in-
creases a country’s chances of becoming a regional 
power. The overall results of the regression analysis are 
mixed, especially with regard to economic performance. 
Countries that are more industrialised and more export-
oriented are more likely to develop their economic infl u-
ence.
The Regional Powers
Europe is the most important economic area in the world. 
This also holds true for production (Figure 2). It has the high-
est share of world income (GDP), but that share has been 
falling since the 1990s, while China’s share has been con-
sistently on the rise. Europe’s decline is not an absolute de-
cline but a relative decline – the regional powers grew much 
faster over the last 20 years than the EU.
China is the only country that has gained a major global in-
fl uence in terms of income and production; India and Bra-
zil’s shares have remained very low, although India’s share 
of world production is on the rise. The rise of the “East” – 
China, India and other emerging economies of Asia – can 
also be demonstrated by the growing infl uence of Asia as 
a whole, including Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Vietnam.
9 For the regressions, we used a simple probit model to produce some 
stylised facts. The main advantage of the regression approach is that 
we can control for other variables (for further details see R. K a p p e l : 
On the Economics of Regional Powers: Comparing China…, op. cit.)
• Observation 4: The regional powers account for a sig-
nifi cant proportion of global foreign trade; however, Bra-
zil’s and South Africa’s shares declined over the period 
shown in the fi gure. Also important in this respect is the 
kind of business signifi cant to the economies of the re-
gional powers. Observations indicate that domestic busi-
nesses apparently play a much greater role sectorally 
than foreign trade and investment statistics would lead 
us to believe. In the SADC, South African businesses 
seem to dominate the regional value chains through, 
among other things, buyer-driven chains (South African 
department stores) and producer-driven chains (brewer-
ies, textile production). The same appears to be true of 
Chinese businesses, but less so of Indian and Brazilian 
businesses. To date, however, there has been a shortage 
of empirically rich studies on integration in value chains.8
• Observation 5: Regional powers have a more differenti-
ated economic structure than other countries in their re-
gions. The value added of the respective manufacturing 
industries is higher than the region’s average.
• Observation 6: Regional powers infl uence 1) the mone-
tary and credit policies of their neighbour countries and 
2) regional cooperation.
8 T.J. S t u rg e o n , G. G e re f f i : Measuring Success in the Global Econ-
omy: International Trade, Industrial Upgrading and Business Function 
Outsourcing in Global Value Chains, in: Transnational Corporations, 
Vol. 18, No. 2, 2009, pp. 1-35.
Figure 1
GDP Growth, Export Growth, Industry Value Growth, 
1980-2009
in %
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• China’s infl uence in imports and exports is growing glo-
bally. This success depends partly on the growing in-
vestment of OECD enterprises in China. These foreign-
invested enterprises account for approximately 45% of 
processing and ordinary exports and imports.11 China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 
also supported its economic rise. In processing exports, 
machinery and electrical products (telecommunications 
equipment), China experienced outstanding growth, 
while the share of traditional exports (textiles, footwear, 
toys) fell to approximately 10% of total exports.
• Europe’s trade infl uence in India, South Africa and Brazil 
is on the decline. The relative shares of imports from the 
EU are falling, but China’s share of the EU’s imports is 
growing.
• Developing regions and countries are becoming more 
signifi cant for Brazil, China and India, meaning that the 
development of the regional powers’ economic trade is 
coming from a deeper trade exchange with developing 
countries, and not from trade with the EU. Trade among 
regional powers intensifi ed rapidly (approximately 22% of 
11 Ordinary trade includes imports that enter China and are not incor-
porated into exported goods. Processing trade includes duty-free 
imports that are incorporated into exports, or exports that rely on 
imported inputs. Processing and ordinary trade together account for 
over 95% of China’s exports and 80% of its imports. China’s skill con-
tent in exports rose because the skill intensity of processing imports 
rose; for the debate on the technological upgrading of China’s indus-
try and the role of export-processing zones see D. R o d r i k : What’s 
So Special About China’s Exports?, in: China & World Economy, 
Vol. 14, No. 5, 2006; and R.C. F e e n s t r a , S.-J. We i  (eds.): China’s 
Growing Role in World Trade, Chicago, London 2010, The University 
Press of Chicago, p. 16.
Europe has remained by far the world’s most important trad-
ing bloc (40% in 2008), followed by North America (16%), 
and East and Southeast Asia (about 20%). Interesting is that 
intra-regional trade is very important in the EU (25%), which 
means that trade among the European countries is very 
much intra-industry trade (manufacturing products, food, 
services). This applies even more to intra-Asian trade: two-
thirds of East and Southeast Asian trade is intra-regional. 
This means that, for instance, China’s trade developments 
depend more on Asian trade growth than on trade with the 
USA and the EU.
In certain parts of the world the European Union has lost 
shares in trade, but in energy-abundant states (oil, gas) and 
the most dynamic region of the world – Asia, especially Chi-
na – its trade shares have been on the rise for more than a 
decade. The EU is able to take better advantage of the re-
gional powers’ growing demand for resources to foster their 
industrial development. In these countries, the EU has real-
ised rising shares (40%, which means more than a doubling 
since 1995).10
Europe’s shares in different sectors are also more or less 
stable (see Tables 1–4), mostly due to Germany’s successful 
export orientation. The EU holds a key position in services, 
(including intra-regional trade), accounting for approximate-
ly 43% in 2010. China’s rise is obvious but not as impressive 
as has been argued (see Tables 2, 3 and 4). The importance 
of India’s economic position is limited to trade in computer 
technology and IT services (Table 4).
Europe’s position in many parts of the world is challenged by 
China and other regional powers for the following reasons:
10 See G. G a u l i e r, F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l , op. cit., pp. 21-22.
Figure 2
Shares in World Income and World Production, 1990-2010
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major role (2009: 55%) in China’s import structure. This 
shows that China is dependent on export markets in the 
West and dependent on imports of raw materials and en-
ergy from developing countries.
• The trade of regional powers with developing countries, 
including resource-abundant countries (oil- and gas-ex-
porting countries, which are also major  importers), now 
plays a dominant role. Exports account for 44% (China) 
and 58% (India), imports 49% (South Africa and Brazil), 
57% (China) and 62% (India). Except for South Africa, 
the respective shares have shown a phenomenal growth 
over the twelve years from 1997 to 2009 (see Table 5). 
This also refl ects the ongoing shift of economic power in 
world trade.
Drivers of Trade
What has driven trade between the EU and China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa?
In contrast to trade with developing countries (with a share of 
approximately 60% of EU exports of fi nal goods), the EU has 
enhanced its position as a supplier of semi-fi nished goods, 
parts and components to China, India, Brazil and South Af-
their exports and 27% of their imports in 2007) but this 
share is mainly driven by China’s imports and exports.12
• South Africa developed differently: exports to the EU are 
growing very fast, while trade with developing countries 
is declining.
• The EU’s share in various groupings of countries (e.g. 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, SADC) is also falling. But China, 
Brazil and India’s trade infl uence in these groupings is 
limited and growing only a little: China and India are be-
coming more important in ASEAN but are also getting 
stronger in many other parts of the world, while Brazil 
and South Africa have lost infl uence in their respective 
regions, partly due to China’s involvement in the oil and 
gas trade and growing exports in those regions.
• The EU plays a more important role in the trade of all 
BRIC countries than vice versa. Russia is the EU’s most 
important export partner, and the EU is China’s most 
important export partner.13 Developing countries play a 
12 G. G a u l i e r, F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l , op. cit., p. 24.
13 P. H a v l i k , R. S t ö l l i n g e r : EU’s Trade with the BRICs and Competi-
tive Challenges, in: Statistika, No. 2, 2010, pp. 136-157.
Table 2
World Exports in Services, Shares in %, 1995 and 
2009
S o u rc e : M. F o u q u i n , H. G u i m b a rd , C. H e r z o g , D. Ü n a l : World 
Economic Overview, Paris 2010, CEPII, December 2010.
Table 3
World Exports in Transport, Shares in %, 1995 and 
2009
S o u rc e : M. F o u q u i n , H. G u i m b a rd , C. H e r z o g , D. Ü n a l : World 
Economic Overview, Paris 2010, CEPII, December 2010.
Table 4
World Trade in Computer and Information Services, 
Shares in %, 1997 and 2008
S o u rc e : M. F o u q u i n , H. G u i m b a rd , C. H e r z o g , D. Ü n a l : World 
Economic Overview, Paris 2010, CEPII, December 2010.
Table 1
World Trade in Manufactures, Shares in %, 1995 and 
2009
S o u rc e : M. F o u q u i n , H. G u i m b a rd , C. H e r z o g , D. Ü n a l : World 





























World foreign direct investments have been growing at an 
extreme rate since the 1990s. FDI has become the major pil-
lar of internationalisation.20 The EU has emerged as the most 
important investor; the major portion of that investment has 
been intra-EU FDI. Regarding EU FDI fl ows, the main part-
ners have been the advanced countries (about 85% since 
the 1990s), and the overwhelming number of EU FDI stocks 
continues to be there. Only a small portion of EU stocks and 
fl ows can be identifi ed in the regional powers (less than 2%, 
see Figure 4).
An evaluation of the trends shows that there has been only 
a modest rise in extra-EU investment in Brazil, South Africa, 
China and India, compared to the steep rise of investment in 
OECD countries:21
• EU FDI fl ows increased steadily over the period 2000–
2009 (see Figure 5).
• The EU’s extra-FDI stocks in the regional powers were 
very low, however (2007): Brazil approximately 3.1%, Chi-
na approximately 1.2% (excluding Hong Kong with 2.8%), 
India approximately 0.6%. The combined share of extra-
EU outward stocks increased by only 2.5 percentage 
points to approximately 10% in 2007 (incl. Hong Kong). 
Hong Kong’s share of extra-EU FDI decreased, while Chi-
na’s investment fl ows increased.
• The share of the EU in inward FDI was very important in 
Brazil (53%) and India (31%) but of minor importance in 
China (10%, excl. Hong Kong with approximately 21%). In 
all regions, the EU is the most important Western investor 
followed by the USA. Major investor EU countries in India, 
China, Hong Kong and Brazil are Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Spain and France.
20 For the data see UNCTAD and Eurostat. 
21 See G. H u n y a , R. S t ö l l i n g e r : Foreign Direct Investment Flows Be-
tween the EU and the BRICS, Vienna 2009, WIIW Research Reports, 
No. 358.
rica, while consumer goods are under-represented. In trade 
with regional powers, intra-industry trade increased, while 
the share of one-way trade fell (from 89% in 1995 to 76% in 
2007). Nevertheless, intra-industry trade with regional pow-
ers lags behind trade with other European countries. This 
shows that geographical proximity and historical ties are im-
portant for deeper exchange.14
The EU’s imports from emerging economies are driven by 
their industrial policies: China, for instance, established in-
dustrial zones and supported the industrialisation and mod-
ernisation of the whole country, and opened up its markets 
to foreign investors. The governments of India, Brazil, South 
Africa (and others) fostered industrial development15 and 
became production bases for manufacturing fi rms from the 
EU, Japan and the United States.
The trade position of the EU in regional powers is strong 
and stable, because European enterprises specialise in 
high-priced/high-quality goods, which help to maintain 
market shares. In these categories, the EU recorded trade 
surpluses, while in low-price segments its share declined 
sharply.16
EU imports from Asia are mainly high-tech products at low 
prices, a fact that refl ects the position of China, which has 
mainly relied on mass-market standardised goods, although 
the export structure changed dramatically (more electron-
ics and machinery, but less apparel and fewer agricultural 
products).17 These successful sectors rely very much on im-
ported inputs from the EU and the USA, however.
EU imports of mining and quarrying products are important, 
in particular from Brazil and Russia.
China, India and Brazil have diversifi ed and upgraded their 
production and maintained their revealed comparative ad-
vantages in both labour-intensive industries and agricul-
ture.18 The EU has maintained and expanded its revealed 
comparative advantages in all countries in skill-, technol-
ogy- and innovative-intensive industries. In these fi elds, the 
EU succeeded in maintaining its trade surpluses.19
14 See ibid.; G. G a u l i e r, F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l , op. cit.
15 P. A g h i o n , J. B o u l a n g e r, E. C o h e n : Rethinking Industrial Policy, 
Brussels 2011, Bruegel Policy Brief 4.
16 G. G a u l i e r, F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l , op. cit., p. 34.
17 As Amiti and Freund show, the skill content of China’s manufacturing 
exports is unchanged once processing trade is excluded. Neverthe-
less, China’s export change was accompanied by increasing speciali-
sation and diversifi cation; see M. A m i t i , C. F re u n d : The Anatomy 
of China’s Export Growth, in: R.C. F e e n s t r a , S.J. We i : Introduction 
to “China’s Growing Role in World Trade”, Cambridge Mass. 2009, 
NBER Working Paper 14716.
18 P. H a v l i k , R. S t ö l l i n g e r, op. cit.
19 G. G a u l i e r, F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l , op. cit., p. 35.
Table 5
Trade with Developing Countries, Shares in %, 1997 
and 2009
S o u rc e : UNCTAD: Merchandise trade matrix, exports and imports, an-
nual, 1995-2009.
Exports Imports
1997 2009 1997 2009
China 45 44 44 57
South Africa 63 48 40 49
India 39 58 43 62
Brazil 39 52 35 49
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words, before becoming wealthy they have achieved a very 
large share of world GDP (measured in purchasing power 
parity) and economic and political infl uence due to their size 
and economic strength.25
China’s economic impact is felt worldwide. It needs miner-
als and oil for its own development, and it acts as a base for 
manufacturing goods. Its size and growth create challenges 
for many countries, including other regional powers. China 
is now an infl uential economic and political global actor and 
is, economically speaking, very strongly networked interna-
tionally. The growing activities in supra-national institutions 
(IMF, World Bank, WTO, WHO etc.) are just examples of the 
growing role of China. China has been successful due to its 
state-led industrialisation based on a planned economy, pro-
tectionism and reliance on market mechanisms, and it has 
become a self-reliant, independent country and a great pow-
er. China is one of the most important importers of energy 
and today the most important global exporter of manufac-
tured products, which are largely produced by foreign fi rms 
located in China. China’s exports show a technological level 
comparable to that of Portugal, which has an income per 
capita (PPP) that is three times higher, but China’s exports 
25 D. R o d r i k , op. cit., pp. 1-19; D. R o d r i k : Making Room for China in 
the World Economy, in: American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceedings, Vol. 100, No. 2, 2010, pp. 89-93; F. L e m o i n e : Past Suc-
cesses and New Challenges: China’s Foreign Trade at a Turning Point, 
in: China and World Economy, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2010, pp. 1-23; F. L e m -
o i n e , D. Ü n a l - K e s e n c i : China and India in International Trade: 
From Laggards to Leaders?, Paris 2007, CEPII Working Paper 19.
• EU outward stocks in the regional powers are concentrat-
ed in services and manufacturing – even in the resource-
abundant states of Brazil and South Africa, investment in 
the primary sector plays a minor role.
• Flows of investment from Brazil, China, India and South 
Africa are growing but not very important (see Figure 5): 
With approximately 6% of extra-EU inward fl ows, they 
are under-represented in the EU. China and India invest 
mainly in Asia, while Brazil is very active in Latin Amer-
ica and South Africa. China’s recent outward activities 
are noteworthy.22 Its outward FDI has been growing very 
fast: $4.5 billion (1990), $17.8 billion (1995) and $23 bil-
lion (2009). The global share of FDI stocks, which was 
extremely low during the 1990s (0.3%), reached 1.2% in 
2009. China’s outward fl ows are mainly located in Asia 
(43% in 2006) and Latin America (48% in 2006). Of all 
outward stocks, 64% were located in Asia (26% in Latin 
America), while Europe’s share is about 3%.
Global and Regional Signifi cance
Without a doubt, the four regional powers observed here 
play a major role in their regions. India and China are both 
global actors. The four countries are heavyweights in re-
gional trade, although less so in terms of their regional in-
vestment (with the exception of South Africa). They are key 
players in regional integration, albeit the monetary and in-
tegrative leadership achievements have been rather weak – 
though increasing – except in the case of South Africa. As a 
result of their strong growth, the regional powers have fos-
tered trade growth in their regions, which has been able to 
compensate somewhat for the negative effects of cut-throat 
competition with neighbouring countries.23 The extent to 
which development aid, investment funds and other public 
goods can compensate the disadvantaged countries for 
the losses suffered should be analysed. To date, however, 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa have taken on this task 
to only a limited extent.24
One could say of India and China that they have achieved 
the status of “global economic powers”, even though they 
continue to be viewed as developing or middle-income 
countries on the basis of their per capita income. In other 
22 See L.K. C h e n g , Z. M a : China’s Outward Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, in: R.C. F e e n s t r a , S.-J. We i . China’s Growing Role in World 
Trade…, op. cit., pp. 545-578.
23 This holds especially true for China in neighbouring Asian countries, 
and South Africa in Southern Africa. China is also a very important 
competitor in South Africa, India and Brazil, and in many middle pow-
ers; for South Africa see L. R a n g a s a m y, J.A. S w a n e p o e l : China’s 
Impact on South African Trade and Infl ation, in: Development South-
ern Africa, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2011, pp. 141-156; for Brazil see R.G. d a 
F o n s e c a : Getting Real, in: The American Interest, Vol. 6, No. 6, 2011, 
pp. 20-25.
24 China is a very important aid donor country – not so the others, al-
though they have plans to establish their own aid agencies. 
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value added in the last 30 years were quite low compared 
to those of China and India. Nevertheless, its global and 
regional activities (MERCOSUR integration, climate policy) 
have been conducive to its accruing great esteem in the 
“global South” and in the G20.27 Its economic power is on 
the rise, but many weaknesses exist (inequality, less dyna-
mism in industrial development). Brazil still exports mineral 
products and natural resource-based manufactured goods. 
But its expanding sectors have been the relatively unpro-
ductive non-tradable sectors (wholesale and retail trade and 
services), while manufacturing declined, as did agriculture.28
27 D. F l e m e s : Brazil: Strategic Options in the Changing World Order, in: 
D. F l e m e s  (ed.), op. cit., pp. 93-112.
28 M.S. M c M i l l a n , D. R o d r i k : Globalization, Structural Change and 
Productivity Growth, Cambridge MA 2011, NBER Working Paper, 
No. 17143; R.G. F l o re s  J r. : Brazil Country Report, in: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung (ed.): Managing the Crisis, Gütersloh 2010, Bertelsmann-Stif-
tung, pp. 1-26.
remain heavily concentrated on low-tech products (approxi-
mately 65% in 2007).26 Its regional infl uence is increasing but 
is still low. China’s regional leadership capabilities are rather 
limited, because the country does not offer enough public 
goods, and its soft power is quite weak, but its rising involve-
ment in the ASEAN countries shows how much the country 
is investing in creating a “good neighbourhood”.
Brazil presents a mixed picture: it is a middle-income coun-
try that has gone through a period of crisis (1981–1993), fol-
lowed by a period of moderate growth and limited recovery. 
Its export growth during the last decade was very high – 
close to 8% on average. Brazil coped well with the fi nancial 
crisis (as did China and India) and has taken steps to becom-
ing a global power. Economically the country is in the proc-
ess of catching up, but GNP growth rates and industrial 
26 I. B e n s i d o u , F. L e m o i n e , D. Ü n a l , op. cit.
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fi xed to the South African rand.34 South Africa is a clear 
leader in the SACU and the CMA. Brazil has made efforts 
to advance monetary integration within MERCOSUR; this 
integration has not yet proceeded very far, however. To 
date there is no sign of a joint currency and no monetary 
leadership on the part of Brazil.35 India’s monetary impor-
tance in the region has been low to date, something that 
can be linked among other things to its very limited invest-
ment and trade within the region.36
Role in International Trade and Investment
For many countries in Asia, China is an important trading 
partner that stimulates its own exports through direct in-
vestment in neighbouring countries, producer- and buyer-
driven chains (sub-contracting and economic networks) 
and an undervalued currency. Although China maintains 
free trade agreements with ten ASEAN states, some-
thing which has led to increasing foreign trade linkages 
with the region (from 4% in 2000 to 12% in 2009), there is 
no monetary integration between China and the ASEAN 
states, and there are no reliable compensation mecha-
nisms.37 China uses the cooperation within the CAFTA 
(China-ASEAN Free Trade Area) for its own trade; the low 
exchange rate has also contributed to its high trade sur-
plus. At the same time, China has started to invest more 
heavily in the ASEAN countries. Because of the dynamics 
of China’s growth and its increased integration into Asia, 
its intra-regional trade is growing, for example in ASEAN 
and also in East Asia. China is simultaneously working to-
ward the regionalisation of the renminbi and has played 
a stronger role in monetary integration in East Asia since 
the Asian fi nancial crisis, and a much stronger role since 
the start of the global fi nancial crisis and the ongoing eco-
nomic and fi nancial crises in the USA and the EU.
Industrial growth rates have been very different in the ob-
served countries over the last 30 years. While Chinese 
and Indian industries succeeded because they combined 
growth with technological upgrading and due to a rise in 
34 The South African rand is also Botswana’s anchor currency; the rand 
is the reference currency for Zimbabwe’s currency; cf. C. McCarthy, 
op. cit.; B. F r i t z , L. M ü h l i c h , op. cit.
35 See B. F r i t z , L. M ü h l i c h , op. cit.
36 S. D u t t a : The Asian Transition and India’s Emerging Strategy, in: N.S. 
S i s o d i a , V. K r i s h n a p p a  (eds.): Global Power Shifts and Strategic 
Transition in Asia, New Delhi 2009, Academic Foundation. 
37 R. C o l a v e c c h i o , M. F u n k e : Volatility Dependence Across Asia-
Pacifi c Onshore and Offshore Currency Forward Markets, in: Journal 
of Asian Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2009, pp. 74-196; L. Z i , C. J i n x -
i a : China and Monetary Integration in East Asia, in: China, Vol. 7, No. 
1, 2009, pp. 124-142; J. S u n : Retrospect of the Chinese Exchange 
Rate Regime after Reform: Stylized Facts during the Period from 2005 
to 2010, in: China & World Economy, Vol. 18, No. 6, 2010, pp. 19-35.
India is very weakly integrated into the global economy 
and the region, but it is catching up based on its high 
growth rate for exports.29 It has positioned itself toward 
medium- and high-range export products (approximately 
47% in 2007), and has moved from low-productivity agri-
culture to modern sectors of the economy. India is without 
doubt exerting more global infl uence, but it is not a sig-
nifi cant regional player, as its low foreign trade integration 
and its very low investment in the region demonstrate.30 
India is poor, its infrastructure is hardly developed (roads, 
harbours, airports, electricity) and only a few sectors are 
competitive.
South Africa is globally insignifi cant but is the leading 
power in its region. Its weak global role is a result of its 
limited economic growth and, above all, the frailty of its 
economically weak neighbouring countries. South Africa 
is taking on the important role of investor and is often the 
most important investor in the region. It is not very im-
portant at the global level because it has a small popula-
tion and does not play a crucial role in global trade – its 
share of world markets is even declining due to the falling 
competitiveness of its export industry. Nevertheless, the 
country is the only meaningful economic power in Africa 
and exercises leadership in the region with respect to in-
vestment, monetary cooperation and institutional infl u-
ence.31
Brazil, South Africa, China and India are active and domi-
nant in the development of cooperation in their respec-
tive regions to very different degrees.32 Most obvious is 
South Africa’s domination of monetary integration in 
South Africa through the SACU (South African Customs 
Union) – which has existed since 1910 – and the Common 
Monetary Area in South Africa (CMA).33 The smaller coun-
tries in the region profi t from the SACU customs revenues 
through a compensatory mechanism. Within the CMA, 
the currencies of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are 
29 P. B a rd h a n : Awakening Giants. Feet of Clay. Assessing the Eco-
nomic Rise of China and India, Oxford 2010, Oxford University Press; 
M.S. Q u re s h i , G. Wa n : Trade Expansion of China and India, in: The 
World Economy, Vol. 31, No. 10, 2008, pp. 1327-1350.
30 R.R. C h a t u r v e d y, D.M. M a l o n e : India and its South Asian Neigh-
bours, Singapore 2009, ISAS Working Paper, No. 100.
31 See R. K a p p e l : Wirtschaft und Entwicklung in Südafrika, in: W. D i s -
t l e r,  K. We i s s e n b a c h  (eds.): Konsolidierungsprojekt Südafrika. 15 
Jahre Post-Apartheid, Baden-Baden 2010, Nomos, pp. 163-185.
32 B. F r i t z , L. M ü h l i c h : South–South Monetary Cooperation: An 
Option for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies to Foster 
Regional Financial Development?, in: O. U g a r t e c h e  (ed.): Beyond 
Bretton Woods: The Transnational Economy in Search of New Institu-
tions, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2010, Palgrave Macmillan.
33 C. M c C a r t h y : The DADC/SACU Interplay in EPA Negotiations, in: H. 
A s c h e , U. E n g e l  (eds.): Negotiating Regions: The EU, Africa and the 
Economic Partnership Agreements, Leipzig 2008, Leipziger Univer-
sitätsverlag.




What do the fi ndings on the economics of the regional 
powers presented here mean for the changes in the world 
economy? (1) The regional powers are of outstanding im-
portance for future economic global developments. (2) 
Those countries that are entering higher-value growth 
markets – like China and India – are deepening their eco-
nomic infl uence on their regions and on the world. The 
resource-dependent countries South Africa and Brazil, 
on the other hand, are of minor importance in the world 
economy. (3) Being a regional power also means making 
advances in research and technological upgrading and 
productivity, which in turn enhances the regional power’s 
appeal. All the regional powers, except China, face major 
problems in their technological catching-up processes, 
due to low levels of education and the low average dy-
namism of their enterprises.42 (4) If the regional powers 
practise soft and smart power and increasingly provide 
public goods, and if they are able to make other countries 
follow their lead, they can become agents of change, thus 
gaining increasing infl uence in global affairs and in the re-
gion. So far, the regional powers discussed in this paper 
have been prevented from playing a more active role in 
the region and in global affairs by their own internal weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities.43 And so far they have lacked 
defi ned and comprehensive global and regional govern-
ance strategies. If they continue to grow as they have over 
the last few decades, if they form effective alliances and 
if they build up the above-mentioned capabilities (soft 
power, networks, provision of public goods), they can 
shift global distribution and end Western domination. 
They can also be strong partners in the global economic 
order. Clubs like the BRICS (including South Africa) or 
IBSA could become more powerful, reshape the world 
and contribute to global and regional solutions to prob-
lems including climate change, energy security, peace, 
stability, monetary integration, poverty reduction and de-
velopment. The regional powers have emerged primarily 
in the economic realm but not as smart powers.44 (5) Bra-
42 Their low spending in R&D (except China) limits the catching-up and 
convergence.
43 India’s high and rising poverty, Brazil and South Africa’s high inequal-
ity, China’s authoritarian regime, the huge transformation processes 
in urbanisation, migration, and the ageing of the population.
44 P. N e l : Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional 
Powers Want, in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2010, 
pp. 951-974; G. C h i n , R. T h a k u r : Will China Change the Rules of 
Global Order?, in: Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010, pp. 
119-138; H.W. M a u l l : World Politics in Turbulance, in: Internationale 
Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 1, 2011, pp. 11-25; S. H a l p e r : The Bei-
jing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the 
Twenty-First Century, New York 2010, Basic Books; A. H u r re l l : Re-
gional Powers and the Global System from Historical Perspective, in: 
D. F l e m e s  (ed.), op. cit., pp. 15-27; S. D e s t r a d i : Regional Powers 
and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership, in: Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2010, pp. 903-930. 
total factor productivities,38 Brazil, South Africa and other 
regional powers failed to catch up technologically with the 
leading OECD countries. Due to this technologically de-
termined development based on large markets with econ-
omies of scale, only China and India can partly exercise 
economic leadership. China has invested heavily in R&D 
infrastructure: R&D spending has increased by approxi-
mately 10% each year since the year 2000. In both coun-
tries an innovation system is on the rise which will change 
economic activity, the economic structure and society. 
However, Japan, Sweden, the USA and Germany remain 
way ahead in overall innovation capacity.39
Our analysis has shown that the regional powers are get-
ting stronger economically. In addition to the economic 
aspects, we should also refer to the soft and smart power 
of China, India, Brazil and South Africa. India, for exam-
ple, describes itself as a global power, although it is un-
able to take on real global responsibility or create reliable 
conditions in the region (for example, for defence and 
security policies in South Asia and in ASEAN).40 So far, 
India’s “soft-power competence” is small.
China is an exponent of a newly forming world order. Its 
growing self-confi dence in foreign policy is a result of its 
economic success story. So far, its regional activities and 
its activities in the international forums are not suffi cient-
ly directed at global and regional governance and pub-
lic goods.41 China’s relations with some of its neighbour 
states are of a more hegemonial nature. Despite close 
economic cooperation, there seems to be a higher degree 
of confl ict than cooperation with India (Kashmir, Tibet, 
Pakistan). China does not yet have enough soft power 
and has not accrued suffi cient esteem. Thus it cannot yet 
assume a global leadership role. Additionally, the number 
of its followers is still relatively small.
38 X. F u , Y. G o n g : International and Intranational Technological Spillo-
vers and Productivity Growth in China, in: Asian Economic Papers, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 1-23.
39 The compounded annual growth rate of economic-wide productivity 
from 1990 to 2005 was 8.78% in China and 4.23% in India; those of 
Brazil and South Africa were below 1%. M.S. McMillan and D. Rodrik 
argue that South Africa and Brazil, countries with comparative advan-
tages in primary products, did not develop their productivity as much 
as China and India, which moved from low-productivity agriculture to 
modern manufacturing. See M.S. M c M i l l a n , D. R o d r i k , op. cit.; see 
D. E r n s t : China’s Innovation Policy Is a Wake-up Call for America, 
Honolulu 2011, Analysis from the East-West Center 100. China and In-
dia appeared to be more conventional emerging countries; however, 
they have recently had both rapid TFP and economic growth; see Z. 
L i : Das chinesische Innovationssystem, Hamburg 2005, Mitteilungen 
des Instituts für Asienkunde, No. 389; B. B o s w o r t h , S. C o l l i n s : 
Accounting for Growth: Comparing China and India, in: Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2008, pp. 45-66.
40 N.S. S i s o d i a , S. D a t t a  (eds.): Changing Security Dynamics in 
Southeast Asia, Delhi 2008, Academic Publishers.
41 On the ongoing debate in China see W. J i s i : China’s Search for a 
Grand Strategy, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2011, pp. 68-79.
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industry, productivity, technology, education system, 
etc.), hard power (economic plus military power), and 
soft power (business networks, cultural institutions, di-
plomacy and migrant networks, academic networks), but 
lacks smart power.47 A debate is currently taking place 
as to whether the EU is an attractive model and a glo-
bal actor. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec48 emphasises that 
the EU is also a regional power, and the EU’s soft power 
is backed by a formidable economic structure which at-
tracts other countries to merge with it. Andrew Moravcsik 
makes it clear that the EU is both a hard and a soft pow-
er. The EU’s civilian and military power capabilities have 
increased: “In many ways Europe is optimally suited to 
project power in the contemporary global system.”49 Oth-
ers point out the inconsistencies in the EU’s presence, 
capabilities and patterns of behaviour. Without going into 
detail, we can state that the EU faces a lot of very severe 
economic, fi nancial and political problems, and its smart 
power is limited.
• The Lisbon strategy of 2000 stated that by 2010 Eu-
rope was to become the most competitive and most 
dynamic knowledge-based economy of the world. 
However, the implementation of this aim has failed due 
to the single-minded actions of particular nations, a 
lack of implementation mechanisms and incoherent 
strategies. Nowadays, declining productivity, weak 
growth, structural unemployment, lack of fl exibility 
in the employment market, demographic decline, the 
ageing of societies and insuffi cient immigration are 
major challenges for the EU. These developments are 
supplemented by very deep fi nancial, economic and 
political crises in several countries (Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain) and in the European Econom-
ic Area.
• In comparison to the USA, the EU is relatively weak in 
the areas of the military, diplomacy and foreign policy 
and is even unable to bring its political and economic 
weight to bear in the neighbouring Mediterranean area 
or with regard to the Middle East, North Africa, China, 
India and the other regional powers. In 20 years it has 
not been able to establish a coherent policy for Turkey, 
and its migration policy is highly controversial. Numer-
ous other examples for a waning EU could be enumer-
ated.
47 Nye defi ned smart power as “the ability to combine hard and soft pow-
er resources into effective strategies”; see J.S. N y e , op. cit., p. 23.
48 A.-M. L e  G l o a n n e c : The European Union as a Regional Power, in: 
N. G o d e h a rd t , D. N a b e r s  (eds.), op. cit., pp. 95-113.
49 A. M o r a v c s i k : Europe: Quietly Rising Superpower in a Bipolar 
World, in: A. A l e x a n d ro f f , A. C o o p e r  (eds.): Rising States, Rising 
Institutions, Washington 2010, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 151-
174.
zil, China and India are important forces in the develop-
ment of international technical and economic norms and 
standards45, in international security, in peace missions 
in confl ict regions, in climate and energy politics, and in 
issues related to currency and the global economy. They 
also have an increasing infl uence within international or-
ganisations (WTO, WHO, UN). They are, like South Africa, 
members of the G20. (6) As numerous studies illustrate, 
the power of states no longer depends only on economic 
and military power, but rather on soft power, that is, their 
networking capacity vis-à-vis other states. The state is 
becoming a “network agency.” Migrant networks, univer-
sities’ allure, research and cultural exchanges, economic 
cooperation and non-state networks limit the infl uence 
of states more strongly than previ ously assumed and are 
making clear how much global networks infl uence states 
– for instance, non-state development organisations; 
pro-fair-trade groups; and the actions of politically ac-
tive groups such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, 
Oxfam and Transparency International. The standardi-
sation of technical norms; the worldwide establishment 
of labour, environmental and human rights standards; 
codes of conduct for businesses, such as corporate so-
cial responsibility (CSR); and the expansion of public-pri-
vate partnerships dem onstrate transnational networks’ 
increasing scope of political action. In these fi elds the EU 
and the USA are much stronger than the regional pow-
ers.46
Consequences for Europe
The EU, the USA and Japan have lost market shares 
globally and in most of the regions, but the EU has been 
successful in defending its role as the biggest economic 
bloc and the most important trading area in the world. 
This success is mostly due to the rising shares in trade 
with China and with oil- and gas-producing countries, 
and the high growth rates of trade with Russia and the 
EU’s neighbouring countries. It is strong because of very 
high investments worldwide, and because of its focus on 
manufacturing, on high-priced, skill-intensive produc-
tion, and on technologically sophisticated production.
The EU (15 and 27) is a major global economic and po-
litical actor. It has signifi cant economic power (income, 
45 R. F o o t , A. Wa l t e r : China, the United States, and Global Order, 
Cambridge 2011, Cambridge University Press.
46 See C. J a k o b e i t , R. K a p p e l , U. M ü c k e n b e rg e r : Civilizing the 
World Order? The Scope and Potential of Transnational Norm-build-
ing Networks, GIGA Focus International Edition, No. 1, Hamburg 
2010, GIGA; U. M ü c k e n b e rg e r : Civilizing Globalism: Transnational 
Norm-Building Networks as a Lever of the Emerging Global Order?, 
in: Transnational Legal Theory, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2010, pp. 523-573.
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leading currency. It is precisely the weakness of the US 
dollar and the euro concurrent with the increase in the 
signifi cance of the Chinese currency which leads to un-
certainty and insecurity in the global economy.
In the G20, regional powers often take positions in dia-
metrical opposition to the ideas of the traditional pow-
ers, which is most obvious with regard to climate policy, 
economic protectionism, industrial policy, the global 
supply of energy and, in particular, values. In this con-
text, it makes no sense to pretend that the increase in 
their wealth also entails their readiness to comply with 
the West on all issues. The opposite is the case: the 
non-unifi ed West will have to learn that China, Brazil, In-
dia and other states will refuse to take orders on how 
to conduct economic, political and cultural matters etc., 
let alone simply adhere to Western values and norms, 
which often display both ambiguities (human rights and 
their application) and endeavours for dominance and ex-
ploitation.
Indeed, regional powers are aspiring to a new order of 
global politics; they no longer want to be followers. They 
are forming new alliances, and countries such as Tur-
key, Indonesia, Venezuela, Iran, South Africa, India and 
Brazil no longer wish to be taken in tow by the USA. To a 
hitherto unprecedented extent, they resent external he-
gemony. They themselves now try to lead; they clearly 
attend to their own interests and they are not prepared 
to compromise at all costs, e.g. in agricultural negotia-
tions, world trade, currency, world health, and member-
ship in the IMF, WTO and the World Bank.
Currently the West is not solving enough global prob-
lems. Europe makes many promises, but the incoher-
ence of its foreign policy and security policy weakens 
its ability to act decisively. Despite strong positions in 
international organisations and despite high economic 
standards and its signifi cant role in global trade and in-
vestment, the “Club of the West” is increasingly losing its 
ability to lead and govern. In many ways, Europe is suc-
cumbing to the belief that it can continue without adapt-
ing. But the rise and dynamism of the “new” is here. Eu-
ropean foreign policy is inhibited. The tendency to act on 
single state policies illustrates its weakness. In order to 
avert further decline and to play a major role in the com-
ing decades, the EU must develop coherent European 
policies for foreign affairs, foreign trade, climate issues, 
energy, fi nance, currency, migration and technology for 
democratic values. In other words, it must enhance its 
economic, hard, soft and smart power. It will also have to 
learn to act and solve global and regional problems with 
the regional powers in the context of a mutual discourse 
on obligations.
• The fi nal and most important argument is the fact that 
the EU is largely preoccupied with itself. In the glo-
balisation process it no longer enjoys the respect of 
others as a model. Eurocentricity prevents Europeans 
from playing a global political role. The predominant 
inward gaze makes them substantially less appealing 
in the eyes of their neighbours (Mediterranean states) 
and also less appealing for African states that are 
turning to China et al. instead of turning to Europe. In 
even more remote countries, Europe displays an eco-
nomic presence (for example, Germany as an inves-
tor and exporter) but has no signifi cant political infl u-
ence due to its inability to take on a “non-European 
perspective”.50 Nevertheless, the EU as the biggest 
economic bloc has a pivotal position in the interna-
tional economic and political order, even though it is 
facing instability and a relative decline in political and 
economic power.51
The further rise of the new regional powers will certainly 
not be linear due to exceedingly inconsistent internal 
situations. Economic growth, the size of the population 
and the size of the country do not automatically entail 
regional, let alone global, leadership. The requirements 
are far higher: reliability, trust of one’s neighbours, soft 
and smart power and the provision of public goods for 
the region and worldwide. It is obvious what the new re-
gional powers lack, and the lessons they will probably 
learn in the near future are plain to see: a regional power 
needs to possess the ability to lead globally or even just 
regionally and to make global public goods available. 
They too rarely take global and regional responsibility. 
Their policies are too unreliable for generating trust in 
the non-OECD world, and also in the EU and the USA.
In the wake of these developments, the transition to 
multipolarity might not be as likely to occur as some 
authors argue. The strategy of the West of integrating 
Russia and China through cooperative relations in order 
to eventually return to unipolarity  (with the USA as the 
leading power) has failed, however, due to strongly lev-
elled power relations between the USA, the EU and the 
regional powers. Collisions of geostrategic interests and 
interests concerning energy and economic policies are 
occurring increasingly. China demands a multipolar cur-
rency order which is to supersede the US dollar as the 
50 H. M a y e r : The Long Legacy of Dorian Gray: Why the European Union 
Needs to Redefi ne its Role in Global Affairs, in: European Integration, 
Vol. 30, No. 1, 2008, pp. 7-25; see H.W. M a u l l , op. cit.
51 R. K a p p e l : The Decline of Europe and the US: Shifts in the World 
Economy and in Global Politics, GIGA Focus International Edition, 
No. 1, Hamburg 2011, GIGA; J.W. L e g ro : The Omnipower: The 
United States and Regional Orders, in: N. G o d e h a rd t , D. N a b e r s 
(eds.), op. cit., pp. 175-192.
